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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
The widow of a deceased coal miner filed this petition for 
review of a decision of the Benefits Review Board in which 
the Board affirmed an Administrative Law Judge's denial of 
her claim for survivors' benefits under the Black Lung 
Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. SS 901-945. For the reasons that 
follow, we will reverse the Board's affirmance of the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision and direct that 
benefits be awarded. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Angelo Mancia filed two applications for Black Lung 
benefits during his lifetime. The Department of Labor 
denied the first one on September 3, 1980. Subsequently, 
Mancia filed a second application, and on April 3, 1984, 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Dunau issued a Decision 
and Order awarding Mancia the requested benefits. The 
ALJ found that Mancia proved he had pneumoconiosis,1 a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Pneumoconiosis is defined as: 
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causal relationship between that affliction and his eight 
years of coal mine employment, and total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis. 
 
On August 5, 1990, Angelo's wife, Josephine, discovered 
Angelo dead behind the wheel of the parked family car. Dr. 
Charles Manganiello, Angelo Mancia's family physician, 
signed the death certificate that stated that the immediate 
cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest with underlying 
causes of anthracosilicosis with emphysema. 
 
Later that same month, Josephine Mancia filed a claim 
for survivor's benefits with the Department of Labor. The 
Secretary administratively denied that claim on February 
12, 1991. After the Secretary denied the claim a second 
time, Josephine requested that the matter be referred to an 
Administrative Law Judge for a hearing, and the claim was 
referred to ALJ Ainsworth Brown. Since Mancia had been 
receiving black lung benefits at the time of his death, a 
stipulation was entered into that the only issue to be 
decided by the ALJ was whether Mancia's death had been 
caused by pneumoconiosis as required for survivor's 
benefits under 20 C.F.R. S 718.250(c). 
 
The ALJ denied the claim, and Josephine Mancia 
appealed to the Benefits Review Board. The Board affirmed 
the ALJ's decision. It concluded that the ALJ, "within a 
proper exercise of his discretion as a fact finder, . . . 
discredited the only medical opinion that could support 
claimant's burden," and, therefore, the widow "failed to 
establish that pneumoconiosis played any part in the 
miner's death. . . ." BRB Decision at 4. 
 
This petition for review followed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including 
       respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal 
       mine employment. This definition includes, but is not limited to, 
       coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, 
       anthrosilicosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis, progressive massive 
       fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis, arising out of coal mine 
       employment. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 718.201. 
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II. THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ALJ 
 
Josephine Mancia, and Armand Mancia (the miner's first 
cousin), testified before the ALJ. Josephine also offered the 
deposition testimony of Dr. Charles M. Manganiello, and a 
letter from Dr. Manganiello, dated August 26, 1991, in 
support of her claims. The Director's evidence consisted 
primarily of a report of Dr. Leon Candor whom the Director 
had retained to render an opinion as to the cause of 
Mancia's death. The Director also offered two documents 
that had been written by Dr. Manganiello in an attempt to 
support Dr. Candor's conclusion, and impeach the contrary 
conclusion of Dr. Manganiello. 
 
A. LAY TESTIMONY 
 
Josephine Mancia testified that her husband had been 
awarded black lung benefits in 1984 and that his health 
seemed to worsen on a daily basis prior to his death. He 
could not breathe well and required assistance doing things 
around the house. She also testified that he was so short 
of breath that his bed was moved to the first floor as he 
could not climb stairs, and he was unable to walk very far 
before complaining of shortness of breath. Hearing 
Transcript, at 8-9. Mancia saw Dr. Manganiello for his 
breathing problems, and was also under the treatment of 
another physician for an unrelated skin condition. Id. at 10.2 
Josephine testified that her husband never complained of 
any chest or heart pain and he was never treated for a 
heart condition. Id. 
 
Josephine further testified that Angelo complained that 
he could not breathe well about one week before he died. 
Id. at 11. She returned home from a bus trip to Atlantic 
City, and found him dead in their car. The motor was not 
running. Id. at 12. 
 
Armand Mancia, testified that he and Angelo were very 
close and that they spent a lot of time fishing at a lake in 
the summertime. Id. at 14. The cottage where they stayed 
was about 200 to 250 feet from a lake. In the year before 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. That condition was cancer, and all the parties and witnesses agree 
that that condition is not implicated in Angelo's death. 
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he died, Angelo had to stop about half-way to the lake to 
catch his breath. Angelo was able to fish only because the 
boat was powered by a motor, and Armand did all of the 
casting. According to Armand, Angelo never complained 
about chest pain or heart problems, nor did he ever tell 
Armand he was taking any medication for any heart 
condition. Armand testified that during the last years of 
Angelo's life he (Angelo) kept "slowing up," that breathing 
was a major problem, and that Angelo could not tolerate 
any physical exertion of any kind because of his problem 
breathing. Id. at 17. 
 
B. DR. MANGANIELLO'S TESTIMONY 
 
Dr. Manganiello's deposition testimony established that 
he had been a licensed physician for 15 years, practicing 
general medicine in a region where coal mining was once 
the prevalent industry. Approximately 10% of his patients 
are former coal miners, and he sees those patients 
primarily for anthracosilicosis and anthracosilicosis-related 
problems. He is, however, neither board-certified nor board- 
eligible in cardiology, occupational medicine, pulmonary 
medicine nor internal medicine. Deposition Transcript, at 7- 
9. 
 
Dr. Manganiello first began treating Angelo Mancia in 
1978, primarily for his underlying pneumoconiosis. He saw 
him at least three times a year thereafter. Mancia's 
medications consisted of bronchodilator therapy and 
respiratory treatments, as well as oxygen therapy as 
needed. Id. at 13. Dr. Manganiello testified he agreed to 
sign Mancia's death certificate at the coroner's request. Id. 
at 14. That death certificate states that the immediate 
cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest with underlying 
causes of anthracosilicosis3 with emphysema. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The statutory definition of pneumoconiosis includes anthracosilicosis. 
20 C.F.R. SS 718.201 & 727.202. The statutory definition of 
pneumoconiosis (i.e. any lung disease that is significantly related to, or 
substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment) is 
much broader than the medical definition, which only encompasses lung 
diseases caused by fibrotic reaction of lung tissue to inhaled dust. 
Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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Dr. Manganiello was confronted with Dr. Candor's 
conclusion that Mancia died of a heart attack. Candor 
based that conclusion partly upon Dr. Manganiello's entry 
on the death certificate. Manganiello answered as follows: 
 
       No where (sic) in my death certificate or in my opinions 
       do I feel that I have ever expressed a myocardial 
       infarction as his cause of death. I'm not sure where 
       [Candor] extrapolated that type of information. And I'm 
       not sure from where he draws his conclusion. Mr. 
       Mancia never had any symptoms related to his heart. 
       And again, the reason for me stating that Mr. Mancia 
       died of a cardiopulmonary arrest is because his heart 
       stopped. Why his heart stopped, in my opinion, was 
       because of his underlying lung condition. The patient 
       had difficulty breathing. He had difficulty oxygenating 
       his heart on the basis of his breathing; and his heart 
       stopped; not because his heart developed a clot, or he 
       damaged his heart. He had no symptoms referable to 
       that. And nowhere could I state that he died of a 
       myocardial infarction.4 And I don't believe that anyone 
       could make that statement. So I am not sure where he 
       extrapolated that information. 
 
Id. at 20-21. Dr. Manganiello was also asked about Dr. 
Candor's reliance on an April 11, 1991 note written by Dr. 
Manganiello. As we discuss below, that note is at the heart 
of the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Manganiello's medical opinion 
as to the cause of Mancia's death. In that note, Dr. 
Manganiello wrote that Mancia had suffered a "heart 
attack" which was a "direct result of his severe 
anthracosilicosis with emphysema." When asked about that 
note, Manganiello stated 
 
       I believe there was one report that I had made, trying 
       to embellish or trying to explain a cardiopulmonary 
       arrest. And I do believe that that report has been 
       mistaken and misunderstood. I totally negate that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Dr. Manganiello explained that a cardiopulmonary arrest is "absolutely 
not" the same as a myocardial infarction. The latter is a heart attack, 
but the heart does not necessarily stop, and unlike a pulmonary arrest 
where the heart stops, many patients survive a myocardial infarction. 
Deposition Testimony, at 26-7. 
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       report. I do not refer to that in any of my thoughts or 
       any of my opinions in terms of his cardiopulmonary 
       arrest. And again, I believe his heart stopped on the 
       basis of his underlying lung deterioration, and 
       problems relating to his underlying anthracosilicosis. 
 
Id. at 21. 
 
On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred 
in response to a question about Manganiello's treatment of 
diseases related to pneumoconiosis: 
 
       Q: Dr., in your testimony this morning, you have 
       talked about treating Mr. Mancia for his 
       pneumoconiosis and related diseases. What are those 
       related diseases? 
 
       A: The pneumoconiosis basically; the underlying 
       infections and problems that he would incur as a 
       result of his severe lung disease. Recurrent episodes of 
       bronchitis. Problems such as cor pulmonale, or build- 
       up of some right-sided heart failure, on the basis of 
       severe underlying lung disease; and problems of that 
       nature. But all related to his lung disease. 
 
Id. at 22. 
 
Manganiello admitted that his reports did not mention 
the presence of cor pulmonale and explained that it was not 
mentioned because it was "basically [an] office concern[ ]," 
which was not necessary to note in a report. Id. at 22-23. 
 
       You could see that the man had some edema of his 
       legs; some swelling in his abdomen from time to time. 
       He required some diuretic therapy from time to time for 
       the treatment of that problem. 
 Id. at 23. Dr. Manganiello further explained that he didn't 
think it was necessary to order objective tests to confirm 
the presence of cor pulmonale because it can be diagnosed 
clinically, and because there is really no treatment for the 
condition once it is diagnosed. Id. "I really don't feel that it 
was necessary to do that. I believe that a clinical diagnosis 
can be just as well treated in the office, without any of 
those studies." Id. at 23. 
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C. DR. MANCIA'S AUGUST 26, 1991 LETTER 
 
Josephine Mancia also introduced a letter from Dr. 
Manganiello, dated August 26, 1991, and addressed "TO 
WHOM IT MAY CONCERN." It reads: 
 
        Mr. Angelo Mancia was under my care for 
       anthracosilicosis. I never treated Mr. Mancia for heart 
       disease or coronary artery disease for that matter. 
 
        The death certificate states cardiopulmonary arrest 
       secondary to anthracosilicosis and there has never 
       been a statement that his death was related to a 
       myocardial infarction. 
 
        It is therefore my opinion that Mr. Mancia's untimely 
       death was a direct result of his anthracosilicosis. 
 
D. THE DIRECTOR'S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE ALJ 
 
The Director's evidence in opposition to the widow's claim 
consisted of a two-page report of Dr. Leon Candor,5 and the 
aforementioned April 11, 1991 note from Dr. Manganiello. 
Dr. Candor never examined the miner. His report was 
based entirely upon his examination of certain medical 
records and the results of tests that Dr. Manganiello and 
other physicians had performed over the years. The 
Director also introduced the death certificate into evidence. 
Dr. Manganiello's April 11, 1991 note is addressed "TO 
WHOM IT MAY CONCERN." The entirety of that note is as 
follows: 
 
        In my opinion Mr. Angelo Mancia (sic) heart attack 
       was a direct result of his severe anthracosilicosis with 
       emphysema which hastened or progressed his 
       underlying coronary artery disease. 
 
Dr. Candor's report details the various medical records 
he reviewed. They include x-rays and the results of tests 
that had been performed on Mancia during his lifetime. 
Based upon his review of those records, Dr. Candor 
concluded: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Director's Brief states that Dr. Candor is a Board-certified 
internist. Director's Br. at 5. However, the ALJ's Decision recites that 
Dr. 
Candor is Board-eligible in pulmonary medicine. ALJ's Decision at 3. 
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       1. As noted in Dr. Manganiello's letter of 4/11/91, the 
       immediate cause of Mr. Mancia's death on 8/5/90 was 
       an acute myocardial infarction with resultant 
       cardiopulmonary arrest. The myocardial infarction 
       (heart attack) was caused by underlying coronary 
       artery disease. 
 
       2. The patient's coronary artery disease with resultant 
       myocardial infarction were casually unrelated to 
       pneumoconiosis. 
 
       3. Despite Dr. Manganiello's statement in his letter of 
       4/11/91, I know of no scientific evidence which 
       indicates that anthracosilicosis or emphysema hasten 
       the progress of coronary artery disease. 
 
       4. The normal arterial oxygen tension at rest and 
       during exercise makes it most unlikely that the 
       patient's chronic lung disease had any effect upon 
       cardiac rhythm and function. 
 
       5. The available information provides no evidence that 
       Mr. Mancia's chronic lung disease was a substantially 
       contributing cause to his death caused by acute 
       myocardial infarction or hastened his death. 
 
E. THE ALJ'S DECISION 
 
The ALJ focused on two aspects of Manganiello's 
testimony and letters in denying the widow's claim. The ALJ 
was clearly troubled by Manganiello's assertion that Mancia 
suffered from cor pulmonale. The ALJ noted that 
Manganiello's letters did not mention cor pulmonale but 
that Manganiello did, nevertheless, testify at his deposition 
that the miner suffered from cor pulmonale. ALJ's Decision 
at 3. The ALJ rejected Dr. Manganiello's explanation of the 
apparent contradiction. The ALJ concluded that 
Manganiello simply assumed that black lung disease played 
a part in the miner's death, and found that Manganiello's 
opinion was not well-reasoned, not supported by objective 
means and not based on competent medical evidence. The 
ALJ concluded that Dr. Manganiello "responded 
disingenuously that the condition `. . . basically were office 
concerns; not . . . things that I felt needed justification in 
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these types of letters.' . . He stated that he did not believe 
that objective testing was necessary." ALJ's Decision at 3. 
 
The ALJ was also troubled by Manganiello's April 11, 
1991 note and the doctor's repudiation of it. The ALJ was 
not convinced by Dr. Manganiello's explanation that he 
"over embellished [him]self a bit" in the note. Deposition 
Transcript, at 28. The ALJ wrote: 
 
       Thus, after writing a note containing a premise Dr. 
       Manganiello pulls the rug out by withdrawing the 
       premise of a heart attack. By withdrawing the letter of 
       April 11, 1991 the doctor inferentially, at least, 
       concedes being less than candid. 
 
ALJ's Decision, at 3. 
 
The ALJ relied upon Dr. Candor's conclusion that Mancia 
died of a myocardial infarction unrelated to his chronic 
lung disease, and he (the ALJ) concluded that Manganiello's 
testimony to the contrary was merely an assumption that 
the miner's lung disease played a role in his death. 
 
       When one views Dr. Manganiello's "rationale" as 
       expressed at his deposition it amounted to nothing 
       more that the doctor assumed that the progressive 
       subjective breathing symptoms were attributable to 
       Black Lung, and that, therefore, when the miner was 
       found dead that Black Lung must have contributed to 
       his death. . . . The most reasonable observation to 
       make is that Dr. Manganiello merely assumed that 
       Black Lung played a part in death. His opinion is not 
       well-reasoned or supported by an objective means and 
       is not found to be based on "competent medical 
       evidence" 20 C.F.R. 718.205(c)(1)(2). 
 
Id. Thus, the ALJ ruled that there is "no credible basis to 
conclude that coal worker's pneumoconiosis played any 
part" in the miner's death. Id. at 4. 
 
The Director now argues that the ALJ weighed 
Manganiello's opinion that pneumoconiosis played a part in 
the miner's death and Candor's opinion to the contrary and 
simply made a credibility determination that we ought not 
overturn. 
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The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision ruling that the ALJ 
properly exercised his discretion as a fact-finder and 
"discredited the only medical opinion that could support 
claimant's burden." BRB's Decision at 4. 
 
III. SCOPE OF REVIEW 
 
We must examine the entire record and determine if the 
ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
 
       The Board is bound by the ALJ's findings of fact if they 
       are supported by substantial evidence. Our review of 
       the Board's decision is limited to a determination of 
       whether an error of law has been committed and 
       whether the Board has adhered to its scope of review. 
       In doing so, we must independently review the record 
       and decide whether the ALJ's findings are supported 
       by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has been 
       defined as more than a mere scintilla. It means such 
       relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
       adequate to support a conclusion. 
 
Kowalchick v. Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
Josephine Mancia's claim for survivor's benefits was filed 
in August of 1990.6 Thus, it was adjudicated under the 
regulations found at 20 C.F.R. S 718.2.7 Under 20 C.F.R. 
S 718.205(a), benefits are provided to "eligible survivors of a 
miner whose death was due to pneumoconiosis." The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. January 1, 1982, was the effective date of amendments to the Black 
Lung Benefits Act. Had Josephine been awarded benefits prior to the 
effective date of the amendments, she would have been entitled to 
derivative benefits based upon the benefits that had been awarded to 
Angelo during his lifetime. However, after the amendments became 
effective, a miner's survivor had to prove that the miner's death was 
caused by pneumoconiosis. Accordingly, Josephine must establish the 
cause of Angelo's death without relying upon his eligibility for benefits 
during his lifetime. See Pothering v. Parkson Coal Co., 861 F.2d 1321 (3d 
Cir. 1988) for a general discussion of the 1981 amendments. 
 
7. 20 C.F.R. Part 718 governs all claims filed after April 1, 1980. 
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 applicable regulations further provide that a miner's death 
will be "considered to be due to pneumoconiosis" if any of 
the following criteria are met: 
 
       (1) Where competent medical evidence established 
       that the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis, or 
 
       (2) Where pneumoconiosis was a substantially 
       contributing cause or factor leading to the miner's 
       death or where the death was caused by complications 
       or pneumoconiosis, or 
 
       (3) Where the presumption set forth at S 718.304 is 
       applicable. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 718.205(c); Director, OWCP v. Siwiec, 894 F.2d 
635, 638 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
Josephine Mancia conceded that the S 718.304 8 
presumption does not apply to her claim. The Director 
conceded that, during his lifetime, the miner suffered from 
pneumoconiosis arising out of his coal mine employment. 
Consequently, the ALJ only had to decide "whether the 
miner's death was caused by pneumoconiosis as required 
by 20 C.F.R. S 718.205(c)." Director's Br. at 3. Thus, 
Josephine Mancia had to demonstrate by a preponderance 
of the evidence that her husband's death was hastened by 
pneumoconiosis. Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 
512 U.S. 267 (1994). "[A]ny condition that actually hastens 
death is a substantially contributing cause of death within 
the meaning of [20 C.F.R. S 718.205(c)(2)]." Lukosevicz v. 
Director, OWCP, 888 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
The ALJ discredited Manganiello's testimony because of 
his "failure" to document cor pulmonale, his April 11, 1991 
note, and his repudiation of it. However, based upon our 
independent review of the entire record we conclude that 
the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Manganiello's conclusion is not 
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we disagree 
with the ALJ's rejection of Manganiello's conclusion that 
Mancia's death was caused by Black Lung Disease. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. 20 C.F.R. S 718.304 lists those circumstances which create an 
irrebuttable presumption of total disability or death due to 
pneumoconiosis. 
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A. COR PULMONALE 
 
Cor pulmonale is a cardiovascular disease and is defined 
as: 
 
       Right ventricular (RV) enlargement secondary to 
       malfunction of the lungs, producing pulmonary artery 
       hypertension that may be due to intrinsic pulmonary 
       disease, an abnormal chest bellows, or a depressed 
       ventilatory drive. The term does not include RV 
       enlargement secondary to left ventricular (LV) failure, 
       congenital heart disease, or acquired valvular heart 
       disease. CP is usually chronic but may be acute and 
       reversible. 
 
THE MERCK MANUAL, Cardiovascular Disorders, 16th ed. 
(1992). The most common cause of cor pulmonale is 
"chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (chronic bronchitis, 
emphysema)." Id. Cor pulmonale has been associated with 
pneumoconiosis as an end-stage complication. See , e.g., 
Kusiak, R., Liss, G. M. & Gailitis, M. M., Cor Pulmonale and 
Pneumoconiosisconiotic Lung Disease: An Investigation Using 
Hospital Discharge Data, 24(2) Am. J. Ind. Med. 161 (1993) 
(This study found that cor pulmonale was diagnosed 17 
times more frequently than expected among men diagnosed 
with pneumoconiosis than among other men admitted to 
the authors' hospital). Thus, given Mancia's undisputed 
medical history of emphysema and pneumoconiosis, it 
would not be unusual if he also suffered from cor 
pulmonale. Part 718 of the applicable regulations 
specifically refer to the relationship between 
pneumoconiosis and cor pulmonale. 
 
We have previously stated that 
 
       "[t]he report of a physician about a miner's degree of 
       disability. . . may have a great deal of significance even 
       if a report lacks full documentation. The report does 
       not necessarily indicate the information upon which 
       the physician relied. It is often buttressed by deposition 
       testimony. . . . For example, the Director informs us 
       that an x-ray is not normally relevant to the degree of 
       disability. If the physician's report fails to mention an 
       x-ray, therefore, that failing should not normally affect 
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       the credibility of the physician's finding of total 
       disability. 
 
Director, OWCP, v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1327 (3rd Cir. 
1987). 
 
Since cor pulmonale is so commonly associated with 
pneumoconiosis, it is not illogical that a treating physician 
did not document that condition in a miner suffering from 
black lung disease. This is especially true since Manganiello 
testified without contradiction that he couldn't treat that 
condition. The ALJ made his credibility determination 
based solely upon a reading of the transcript without the 
advantages that would come from viewing a witness as he 
or she testifies, and the Director offered no evidence to 
rebut Manganiello's testimony that Mancia did suffer from 
cor pulmonale. 
 
Dr. Candor's report does not comment upon the presence 
or absence of cor pulmonale. The ALJ's conclusion that 
Manganiello's testimony regarding the presence of cor 
pulmonale was "disingenuous" amounts to little more than 
the ALJ substituting his own medical assessment for that 
of the treating physician. This record does not support the 
ALJ's jaundiced view of Manganiello's testimony regarding 
Mancia's cor pulmonale. The ALJ placed too much reliance 
upon the treating physician's failure to order diagnostic 
tests absent some medical evidence that diagnostic tests for 
cor pulmonale were necessary. The ALJ's analysis compels 
a treating physician to order diagnostic tests which the 
physician feels are not needed merely to provide "objective 
tests" that will satisfy an ALJ at a possible subsequent 
administrative hearing. 
 
B. THE DEATH CERTIFICATE 
 
During his deposition, Manganiello explained that he 
enters cardiopulmonary arrest as the cause of death on 
90% of his death certificates. He added: 
 
       I'd probably put [cardiopulmonary arrest] on 100% of 
       them, but I just sometimes run into the same problem 
       . . . we're into right now. I'm just not sure what 
       the big stigma is about cardiopulmonary arrest. 
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       Cardiopulmonary means that the heart has to stop, as 
       far as my opinion goes. And maybe I'm just signing my 
       death certificates inappropriately. But I just feel that 
       your heart stops. And why does your heart stop? It 
       stops because some condition causes it to stop. That's 
       why I sign them that way. It's my usual customary 
       practice. 
 
Id. at 26. He remained emphatic on cross-examination, and 
he steadfastly insisted that Mancia did not die because of 
a heart attack. 
 
In Smakula v. Weinberger, 572 F.2d 127 (3rd Cir. 1978) 
we noted the common practice of completing death 
certificates in this manner. There, a miner died suddenly, 
and his widow applied for survivor's benefits alleging that 
the miner's death had been caused by black lung disease. 
The ALJ ruled that the widow had established causation, 
but the Appeals Council, acting for the Secretary, reversed, 
and the district court entered summary judgment for the 
Secretary. On appeal, we remanded with directions to 
award widow's black lung benefits as the reversal of the 
ALJ's determinations had not been based upon substantial 
evidence. The death certificate there stated that the miner 
died from "coronary occlusion." That was the only cause of 
death given on the death certificate. We noted, however, 
that the entry on the certificate was "sparse and unverified 
by clinical findings [and that] testimony at the hearing cast 
grave doubt on [the certificate's] reliability." Id. at 131. The 
mortician who arrived at the scene within 15 or 20 minutes 
of the miner's collapse testified that he took a death 
certificate to a local physician who "filled in`coronary 
occlusion' as the cause of death, signed the certificate, and 
handed it back to [the mortician]" Id. at 132. That doctor 
had never examined the miner, and had no basis for 
concluding that his cause of death was as stated on the 
death certificate. In affirming the ALJ's determination that 
the widow had established that the miner's death was 
caused by black lung disease despite the contrary 
statements on the death certificate we accepted the 
mortician's explanation that, "in his experience,. . . 
standard procedure by the coroner's office was not to 
bother with examination of the bodies and perfunctorily 
attribute cause of death to a heart attack." Id. 
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In Hillibush v. Benefits Review Board, 853 F.2d 197 (3rd 
Cir. 1988), we stated 
 
       We have previously determined that a death certificate 
       listing "coronary occlusion" and neither listing any 
       other contributing conditions, nor indicating that an 
       autopsy or other physical examination had been made 
       of the body, is inherently unreliable and does not 
       constitute substantial evidence that the miner died of 
       a coronary occlusion for purposes of determining a 
       widow's entitlement to black lung benefits. In that case 
       there was testimony that it is common practice, absent 
       an autopsy, for coroners to enter coronary occlusion as 
       the cause of death of miners. 
 
853 F.2d at 204. We ruled "[w]e hold that in the absence of 
an autopsy, a death certificate may not be used to preclude 
invocation of a presumption of a totally disabling 
respiratory or pulmonary impairment." Id. 
 
Although this case is distinguishable, our holding in 
Smakula and Hillibush is instructive in assessing the 
probative value of Manganiello's statements on the death 
certificate, and his credibility in explaining the entry. There, 
as here, there was lay testimony about the deceased 
miner's difficulty in breathing, and the degree to which that 
difficulty appeared to compromise his health and limit his 
daily routine. Similarly, there, as here, "no doctor had ever 
attributed her husband's progressive respiratory difficulties 
to a heart ailment." Smakula, 572 F.2d at 133. More 
importantly, here, Dr. Manganiello related Mancia's stopped 
heart to his pneumoconiosis on the death certificate. "[T]he 
fact that the immediate cause of death was cardiac arrest 
does not preclude the possibility that the miner had a 
respiratory or pulmonary impairment; the two conditions 
are not inconsistent with each other."9  Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Dr. Manganiello explained that coronary artery disease is not related 
to pneumoconiosis and that pneumoconiosis does not cause coronary 
artery disease, although it could be a risk factor for coronary artery 
disease. Deposition at 29. 
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C. THE APRIL 11, 1991 NOTE 
 
Mancia's cryptic note of April 11, 1991, is far more 
troubling. Although the ALJ was not required to accept 
Manganiello's explanation of the contents of that note, nor 
his repudiation of it, the ALJ was not free to ignore the 
totality of the "objective evidence" that he complained was 
lacking, and the lay corroboration of that evidence, and give 
inappropriate weight to that note. The objective tests that 
were performed, the testimony of Mancia's treating 
physician, and the uncontradicted testimony of Josephine 
and Armand Mancia all clearly establish that Mancia never 
complained of, and was never treated for, any heart 
problem. Similarly, as is discussed more fully below, Dr. 
Candor ignored Mancia's entire medical history in order to 
focus upon the 27 word note written in unexplained 
circumstances. Candor concluded that Mancia died of a 
heart attack unrelated to his black lung disease even 
though there is no evidence that any of the numerous 
objective tests that were performed in the 12 years 
preceding Mancia's death suggested a heart problem. 
 
Josephine testified that a week before his death her 
husband, "was telling [her] that he couldn't breathe and he 
was to go to Manganiello. And when he couldn't breathe, he 
used to get like white to his face". Hearing Transcript, at 
11. There was no mention of chest pain. Similarly, as noted 
above, Armand testified that "[h]is breathing was his major 
problem; shortness of breath, really. He couldn't do any 
physical exertion of any kind." Id. at 17. Again, there was 
no suggestion of chest pain or related heart problems. The 
ALJ simply ignored this testimony and relied completely 
upon the non-treating physician's unsupported conclusion 
that Mancia died of a heart attack. 
 
In Hillibush, the ALJ ignored lay testimony describing the 
problems the miner had breathing, and his difficulty with 
exertion shortly before his death. We ruled that it was error 
for the ALJ to conclude that the miner died of a heart 
attack despite such lay testimony merely because of the 
unsubstantiated entry to that effect on the death certificate. 
We realize that the regulations in effect when we decided 
Hillibush specifically provided that the finding of causation 
in a survivor's claim should be made based upon a 
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consideration of "all relevant evidence." Id. at 202,10 while 
the current regulation is more restrictive. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 718.205(c). However, the change in the regulation does 
not allow the ALJ to ignore uncontradicted relevant lay 
testimony where it corroborates the medical testimony of a 
treating physician and is consistent with the medical 
records. 
 
Indeed, the ALJ's only explanation of his rejection of Dr. 
Manganiello's conclusion that Mancia died because of his 
black lung disease is as follows: 
 
       When one views Dr. Manganiello's "rationale" as 
       expressed at his deposition it amounted to nothing 
       more than the doctor assumed that the progressive 
       subjective breathing symptoms were attributable to 
       Black Lung, and that, therefore, when the miner was 
       found dead that Black Lung must have contributed to 
       his death. . . . The most reasonable observation to 
       make is that Dr. Manganiello merely assumed that 
       Black Lung played a part in death. His opinion is not 
       well-reasoned or supported by any objective means and 
       is not found to be based on "competent medical 
       evidence." 20 C.F.R. S 718.205(c)(1)(2). 
 
ALJ's Decision at 3. 
 
However, Dr. Manganiello explained his "assumption" as 
follows: 
        I mean, the cause of death, as far as I am concerned, 
       is the contributing factor that made his heart stop; and 
       that is the antracosilicosis. Nowhere on that death 
       certificate does it state anything more than that. 
 
* * * 
 
       The rational behind that was the fact that he had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We stated that "30 U.S.C. S 932(b) (1982) required that [i]n 
determining the validity of claims under this part, all relevant evidence 
shall be considered, including where relevant, medical tests such as 
blood gas studies, . . . [and] evidence submitted by the claimant's 
physician, or his wife's affidavits, and in the case of a deceased miner, 
other appropriate affidavits of persons with knowledge of the miner's 
physical condition, and other supportive materials." Id. at 202. 
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       ongoing problems related to his lung disease. And he 
       had ongoing symptoms revealing that he was 
       deteriorating from his lung condition. And he had no 
       other symptoms, and no other problems that would 
       cause his untimely death. Therefore, my rationale is 
       that it is his underlying lung disease that caused his 
       death. 
 
Deposition Transcript, at 19. 
 
D. THE STANDARD FOR EVALUATING 
       MEDICAL TESTIMONY 
 
In Kertesz v. Director, OWCP, 788 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 
1986), we discussed the general principles by which an ALJ 
must evaluate medical evidence. We wrote: 
 
        In reaching a decision, an ALJ should set out and 
       discuss the pertinent medical evidence presented. The 
       ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any 
       medical expert, but may weigh the medical evidence 
       and draw its own inferences. Moreover, the ALJ should 
       reject as insufficiently reasoned any medical opinion 
       that reaches a conclusion contrary to objective clinical 
       evidence without explanation. 
 
        In weighing medical evidence to evaluate the 
       reasoning and credibility of a medical expert, however, 
       the ALJ may not exercise absolute discretion to credit 
       and discredit the expert's medical evidence. [A]n ALJ is 
       not free to set his own expertise against that of a 
       physician who presents competent evidence. 
 
Id. at 163 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
Moreover, "[a] testifying physician need not express his 
conclusions in terms of `reasonable degree of medical 
certainty' to be credited by the ALJ; the ALJ must instead 
accept a `documented opinion of a physician exercising 
reasoned medical judgment' ". Tennessee Consolidated Coal 
Co. v. Crisp, 866 F.2d 179, 185 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 
Although an ALJ may properly reject a medical opinion 
"that does not adequately explain the basis for its 
conclusion," Risher v. OWCP, 940 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 
1991); see also, Brazzalle v. Director, OWCP, 803 F.2d 934, 
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936 (8th Cir. 1986), the ALJ is not free to do so merely 
because he or she interprets the medical opinion as an 
assumption. The ALJ's rejection of Dr. Manganiello's 
opinion as an "assumption" imposes a requirement akin to 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty that is not required.11 
In basing his opinion upon a single cryptic note and 
ignoring the contrary medical evidence (corroborated by 
uncontradicted lay testimony) that Mancia was not 
suffering from heart problems at the time of his death, the 
ALJ rejected a medical opinion that was consistent with, 
and corroborated by, the results of Mancia's pulmonary 
function exams, and his x-rays. Dr. Manganiello explained 
the basis of his conclusion that Mancia did not die of a 
heart attack. Based upon this record, the ALJ could not 
simply reject that reasoned assessment of the cause of 
Mancia's death by labeling it an "assumption." 
 
The "assumption" which so concerned the ALJ was a 
hypothesis based upon Mancia's medical history, and Dr. 
Manganiello's treatment of Mancia during the 12 years 
leading up to his death. There is nothing inconsistent 
between such an "assumption", and reasoned medical 
judgment. 
 
       Reasoned medical judgment has been defined in 
       personal injury cases as a hypothesis representing a 
       physician's professional judgment as to the most likely 
       one among the possible causes of the physical 
       condition involved. This definition has been accepted in 
       litigation under the Black Lung Benefits Act. 
 
Brazzalle v. Director, OWCP, 803 F.2d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 
1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See Plesh v. Director, OWCP, 71 F.3d 103 (3rd Cir. 1995); Drummond 
Coal Co. v. Freeman, 733 F.2d 1523, 1526 (8th Cir. 1984) (reasoned 
medical judgment is all that is required, and opinions need not be 
expressed in terms of reasonable degree of medical certainty); Peabody 
Coal Co. v. Helms, 859 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1988)(same). Although 
these, and other cases cited therein, address the"reasoned medical 
judgment" standard as it relates to the presumption that arises under 20 
C.F.R. S 725.203(a)(4), we see no distinction between that standard and 
the "reasoned medical judgment" necessary to establish entitlement to 
survivor's benefits here. 
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Moreover, a physician's medical judgment, even if based 
on instinct, "is nonetheless grounded in years of 
experience" and has a "great deal of significance." Director, 
OWCP v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d at 1327. In Mangifest we 
stated 
 
       [l]ike other judgments, a medical judgment is 
       sometimes based upon instinct, the unarticulated and 
       unarticulable opinion that is nonetheless grounded in 
       years of experience. Apparently out of respect for this 
       medical intuition, the regulations permit an ALJ tofind 
       total disability on the basis of medical judgments even 
       if the medical tests are inconclusive. 
 
826 F.2d at 1327. In Mangifest, a miner seeking disability 
benefits submitted several reports from various physicians 
that did not meet the regulatory requirements for valid 
medical tests. We held that "a medical judgment contained 
in a noncomplying report may constitute substantial 
evidence of disability if, . . . it is reasoned and based on 
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 
technique. . . . The ALJ must base this determination on all 
the facts of the case." 826 F.2d at 1327. Here, although the 
ALJ questioned Manganiello's credibility regarding his 
explanation of the April 11 note, the ALJ did not doubt that 
Manganiello believed that Mancia died of pneumoconiosis. 
Rather, the ALJ rejected Manganiello's belief as a mere 
"assumption." However, that "assumption" was a medical 
opinion regarding his patient of 12 years, and is supported 
by Mancia's pneumoconiosis, and the lay testimony. 
Accordingly, it was not only unfair for the ALJ to disregard 
the treating physician's medical opinion as merely an 
"assumption," it was error to do so. Indeed, "assumptions" 
based upon a patient's medical history, and confirmed 
diagnosis can constitute the required "objective medical 
means" that the ALJ mistakenly concluded was lacking in 
this case. Moreover, the ALJ selectively labels Dr. 
Manganiello's opinion an "assumption" but does not explain 
why Dr. Candor's contrary opinion of the cause of Mancia's 
death is not also an "assumption." 
 
This case is unlike Lango v. Director, OWCP, 104 F.3d 
573 (3d Cir. 1997), where the miner's treating physician 
merely made conclusory statements as to the miner's cause 
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of death. Here, Manganiello explained the basis for his 
opinion. With the exception of the April 11, 1991 note, 
Manganiello clearly, consistently and unwaveringly opined 
that the miner's chronic lung disease led to his 
deteriorating medical condition and, ultimately, to his 
death. 
 
Moreover, and most importantly, the issue here is 
whether the pneumoconiosis that so gravely afflicted 
Mancia "even briefly" hastened his death. Lukosevicz, 888 
F.2d at 1004. Thus, even assuming that Mancia did suffer 
a heart attack despite the absence of objective evidence that 
he did, the ALJ ignores Dr. Manganiello's uncontradicted 
testimony that Mancia's pneumoconiosis would still have 
hastened his death. Manganiello was asked a hypothetical 
question as to whether Mancia's underlying lung disease 
would have had any effect on his ability to survive a heart 
attack if he had suffered one. He responded: 
 
       if someone had underlying heart disease and lung 
       disease, as opposed to someone just having underlying 
       heart disease and no lung disease; and if indeed they 
       had a myocardial infarction, what would be your 
       chances of surviving a myocardial infarction or a 
       purely heart related death, given no lung disease, and 
       then given the type of lung disease that Mr. Mancia 
       had. And in that frame of reference, I believe that Mr. 
       Mancia, given his significant lung diseases that we are 
       talking about, I believe that he would have a much less 
       chance of surviving a myocardial infarction or a heart- 
       related death than another person without that type of 
       disease. . . . But again, I don't believe that that relates 
       to Mr. Mancia's case. And I don't believe Mr. Mancia 
       suffered from any underlying heart disease; and I don't 
       believe that he died of a myocardial infarction. 
 
* * * 
 
       I believe that he would have a much more difficult time 
       surviving a myocardial infarction, given his underlying 
       lung disease, pneumoconiosis, to whatever degree. Just 
       because he would be unable to sustain a good 
       oxygenation of his heart. And further improvement of 
       heart function, in the face of heart damage, would 
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       require good stable lungs, good oxygenation to pull him 
       through an event. Given his underlying lung condition, 
       he would have a much more difficult time and run the 
       higher risk of arrhythmias, skipped beats, and further 
       deterioration of his heart, on the basis of his lungs not 
       being able to keep up to an ongoing deterioration 
       caused by an acute myocardial event. 
 
Deposition Testimony, at 32-3. Manganiello added that his 
answer to the hypothetical would be the same if he 
assumed Mancia had a "totally disabling pneumoconiosis 
as determined by the Department of Labor" as if he had 
severe pneumoconiosis. Id. at 32. Manganiello's response is 
consistent with the regulations. 20 C.F.R. S 410.462(b) 
states: 
 
       Where the evidence establishes that a deceased miner 
       suffered from pneumoconiosis or a respirable disease 
       and death may have been due to multiple causes, 
       death will be found due to pneumoconiosis if it is not 
       medically feasible to distinguish which disease caused 
       death or specifically how much each disease 
       contributed to causing death. 
 
E. DR. CANDOR'S REPORT 
 
Dr. Candor's report is the only medical conclusion 
consistent with the ALJ's finding that Mancia's death was 
not caused by complications related to his black lung 
disease. Absent that report, the record reflects only the 
ALJ's conclusion that Manganiello's opinion is not well 
reasoned, and the ALJ's concern that Manganiello's opinion 
is not corroborated by objective evidence. Accordingly, we 
examine Dr. Candor's report to determine if the ALJ's 
conclusion is properly supported by substantial evidence in 
the record. 
 
As noted above, Dr. Candor was a non-treating physician 
who was hired by the Director to review the miner's medical 
records. In a different context, we have held that the 
opinion of a miner's treating physician "play[s] a major role 
in the determination of eligibility for black lung benefits." 
Schaaf v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1978); see 
also Lango v. Director, OWCP, 104 F.3d at 577 ("[T]he 
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treating physician's opinion merits consideration."). 
Nonetheless, "the opinion of a non-examining physician in 
a black lung case may in some circumstances have 
probative worth supporting substantial evidence," Evosevich 
v. Consolidation Coal Co., 789 F.2d 1021, 1028 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
 
In Evosevich, the coal company opposing the miner's 
black lung claim hired two physicians. One physician 
personally examined the miner and, on the basis of that 
examination, concluded that the miner was not disabled. 
The other physician hired by the company opposing the 
payment of benefits did not examine the miner but instead 
based his opinion that the miner was not disabled on the 
basis of his review of the records. The ALJ found that the 
opinions of both physicians were sufficient to rebut the 
interim presumption of disability under the applicable 
regulations. On appeal, the miner argued, inter alia, that 
the ALJ erred by according substantial weight to the 
opinion of the non-examining physician. We disagreed. 
 
However, in Evosevich, the ALJ used the opinion of the 
non-examining physician to corroborate the opinion of the 
examining physician. Id. at 1028. He did not use it by itself 
to defeat the miner's claim. Although there may be 
situations where the nature of a non-treating physician's 
report is sufficient, in context with all the other evidence in 
the case, to support a conclusion that is contrary to the 
opinion of a treating physician, this is not such a case. 
Candor's report was the Director's case. See Hearing 
Transcript at 20 ("Your Honor, the Director relies on Dr. 
Candor's (sic) report, which states that pneumoconiosis, 
which Mr. Mancia did have, did not in any way contribute 
to or hasten his death.") (emphasis added). 
 
In his report, Dr. Candor criticized Dr. Manganiello. Dr. 
Candor stated: "[d]espite Dr. Manganiello's statement in his 
letter of 4/11/91, I know of no scientific evidence which 
indicates that anthracosilicosis or emphysema hasten the 
progress of coronary artery disease." See P 3, Candor's 
Report. However, Dr. Manganiello testified in agreement 
with Dr. Candor thus further undermining the very 
document that Candor's report is based upon. During 
Manganiello's deposition, the following exchange occurred: 
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       Q: Is coronary artery disease related to 
       pneumoconiosis? 
 
       A: No, not really. 
 
       Q: So pneumoconiosis does not cause coronary artery 
       disease? 
 
       A: No. It could be a risk factor, I would imagine. But, 
       to my knowledge, no. 
 
Id. at 28-29. Thus, both physicians agree that 
anthracosilicosis does not cause or contribute to coronary 
artery disease. 
 
The ALJ rejected Dr. Manganiello's medical conclusion 
because it was not supported by objective evidence. Yet, the 
objective evidence on this record contradicts Candor's 
report. Dr. Candor's report states that his review of 
numerous x-rays "indicates a negative finding" for 
pneumoconiosis. He notes: "[a]lthough the chest x-ray of 
9/20/82 was positive for simple pneumoconiosis, 12 the 
chest x-rays of 8/1/80, 12/21/88 and 2/21/89 were read 
negative for pneumoconiosis by separate and different B- 
readers. In addition the latest x-ray report (4/25/90) was 
read negative for pneumoconiosis by a field reader." 
Candor's Report at 1. Yet, as noted above, the Director 
concedes that Manganiello had pneumoconiosis. Moreover, 
our review of the x-ray reports in the record from the 
hearing before ALJ Dunau13 casts doubt upon Dr. Candor's 
review and his conclusion. The "Findings" on the report of 
the x-ray taken on 4/26/78 state: "1st stage 
anthracosilicosis with emphysema." That report is one of 
those Dr. Candor said he reviewed, but he suggests that 
the x-ray was negative despite the aforementioned 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Pneumoconiosis is customarily classified as"simple" or 
"complicated." Simple is caused by dust alone and is identified by small 
opacities in the lung fields visible on a chest x-ray. Complicated, which 
is generally more serious, involves progressive massive fibrosis as a 
complex reaction to dust and other factors. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 7 (1976). 
 
13. At oral argument, counsel for the Director informed the panel that 
the record of the proceedings before ALJ Dunau were incorporated into 
the record before ALJ Brown. 
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"conclusion." See Director's Exhibit No. 27. Similarly, a 
report of an x-ray taken on October, 22, 1986 states "[T]he 
lungs are hyperaerated and show a pattern compatible with 
chronic obstructive disease." See Director's Exhibit No. 19. 
Dr. Candor's report does not mention an x-ray taken on 
this date, though he does refer to one taken on October 26, 
1986. We can not determine if one of these two dates is in 
error, or if two x-rays were taken within 4 days of each 
other. In any event, the ALJ's opinion does not mention this 
discrepancy. 
 
Even more glaring, however, is Dr. Candor's reference to 
a pulmonary function report "obtained on 9/30/82." 
Candor's Report at 1. Dr. Candor concludes that the 
pulmonary function values taken on that date "meet 
standard." However, the record contains the actual report 
of the test that was conducted on that date, by Dr. E.J. 
Biancarelli, and Dr. Biancarelli's conclusions about the 
report.14 Dr. Biancarelli's note states: 
 
       Mr. Mancia was examined by me on 9/30/82 at which 
       time his ventilation studies were abnormal in all 
       parameters. He became dyspneic doing them. His chest 
       x-ray showed coal miner's pneumoconiosis, category 
       1/2Q. He had distant breath sounds as well as rales 
       and wheezing upon physical examination. 
 
       He is unable to lift, carry, walk uphill, upstairs or 
       against the wind. 
 
Directors Exhibit No. 22 (emphasis added). 
 
ALJ Dunau noted that, although Dr. Candor reported 
that a pulmonary function study performed on September 
30, 1980 was normal, the ALJ adjusted the study for 
Mancia's age, sex and height and concluded that "values 
obtained by Dr. Candor are below those set forth in the . . . 
regulations . . . as sufficient to establish total disability." 
ALJ Dunau's Decision and Order at 3-4. We cannot 
determine if ALJ Dunau's Decision and Order refers to a 
test performed on September 30, 1980 or if she erred and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Mancia was referred to Dr. Biancarelli pursuant to his claim for 
miner's benefits, and Dr. Biancarelli conducted several tests on him on 
different occasions. See Transcript of Hearing Before ALJ Dunau, at 30. 
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was actually referring to the same September 30, 1982 test. 
In any event, Dr. Cander's report is at odds with the report 
of the physician who conducted the test on September 30, 
1982, and ALJ Brown nevertheless accepted Cander's 
report without question. 
 
Moreover, Dr. Candor's report in this survivor's claim is 
inconsistent on its face. Candor's report notes that he 
reviewed a valid arterial blood gas study that "indicated a 
supernormal arterial oxygen tension at rest which rose 
further during exercise." Candor's Report at 2. Yet, Candor 
concludes in his report that the "normal arterial oxygen 
tension at rest and during exercise makes it most unlikely 
that the patient's chronic lung disease had any effect upon 
cardiac rhythm and function." Id. The ALJ credits this 
objective medical evidence and therefore apparently accepts 
Candor's conclusion that Mancia's ABG was both 
"supernormal" and normal at the same time, and that it 
rose further (above "supernormal") during exercise, and 
remained normal during exercise simultaneously. 
 
Despite the fact that Candor's report states that he 
examined numerous records including x-rays and results of 
various examinations conducted upon Mancia over the 
years, his conclusion appears to rest solely upon 
Manganiello's April 11, 1991 note. At P 1 of his conclusions, 
Candor states: 
 
       As noted in Dr. Manganiello's letter of 4/11/91, the 
       immediate cause of Mr. Mancia's death on 8/5/90 was 
       an acute myocardial infarction with resultant 
       cardiopulmonary arrest. The myocardial infarction 
       (heart attack) was caused by underlying coronary 
       artery disease. 
 
Candor's Report at 2. The only evidence in this record that 
Mancia died of a myocardial infarction was the 4/11/90 
note written by Dr. Manganiello. Similarly, at P 3 of 
Candor's report he concludes: 
 
       Despite Dr. Manganiello's statement in his letter of 
       4/11/91, I know of no scientific evidence which 
       indicates that anthracosilicosis or emphysema hasten 
       the progress of coronary artery disease. 
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Id. Dr. Cander assumed that Mancia died of a heart attack 
and that assumption influenced his opinion as to what, if 
any role, Mancia's underlying pneumoconiosis played in his 
death. Dr. Candor concludes in his report: 
 
       The available information provides no evidence that Mr. 
       Mancia's chronic lung disease was a substantially 
       contributing cause to his death caused by acute 
       myocardial infarction or hastened his death. 
 
Id. However, the totality of the evidence does not support 
the conclusion that Mancia suffered a heart attack. The 
ALJ was not free to selectively credit testimony merely 
because it supports a particular conclusion while ignoring 
all evidence contrary to that conclusion. 
 The ALJ held that Manganiello's opinion was "not 
supported by objective means," yet he did not indicate what 
objective means he had in mind. Chest x-rays are used to 
determine the existence of pneumoconiosis, 20 C.F.R. 
S 718.202, and pulmonary function and blood gas studies 
are used to determine the degree of a miner's level of 
disability caused by pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. 
S 708.204(c)(1) and (2). None of these objective means 
would have been necessary because of the Director's 
concession that the miner was disabled because of his 
pneumoconiosis arising out of his coal mine employment. 
Furthermore, it would have been unnecessarily cruel to 
subject the miner to further unnecessary pulmonary 
function and blood gas studies because both tests can be 
very painful to a miner already diagnosed as having 
pneumoconiosis. See, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, 
JUDGES' BENCHBOOK OF BLACK LUNG BENEFITSACT, U.S. DEP'T OF 
LABOR, Chapter 2: Introduction to Medical Evidence, 
January, 1997.15 Finally, and most importantly, these tests 
are conducted on living miners and would not be at all 
helpful in answering the critical question here, i.e., did 
pneumoconiosis cause or substantially contribute to the 
miner's death. 
 
An autopsy was not performed. However, the ALJ did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Available electronically at 
http://204.245.136.2/public/blalung/refmc/bbb2.htm. 
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find, and the Director does not contend, that an autopsy is 
the only acceptable way to determine whether a miner's 
lung disease caused his death. We will not require one in 
cases like this by concluding that Josephine Mancia has 
not met her burden of proof. 
 
In sum, we do not believe that this record contains that 
quantum of evidence that a reasonable mind wouldfind 
necessary to support ALJ Brown's rejection of Dr. 
Manganiello's opinion that Mancia's black lung disease 
hastened his death. Kowalchick. 
 
V. 
 
In his brief, counsel for Josephine Mancia requests that 
we do not remand for further proceedings but that we 
remand to the Board with a direction to award her 
survivor's benefits based, inter alia, on her age and the 
protracted history of her case. See Appellant's Br. at 17. 
However, at oral argument, counsel merely requested a 
remand to the ALJ for further proceedings. Mrs. Mancia's 
claim for survivor's benefits has been making its way 
through the administrative process for seven years and she 
is now 78 years old. We have previously expressed our 
concern over the "dismaying inefficiency" of the black lung 
administrative process. Lango v. Director, OWCP, 104 F.3d 
at 575-576. Nonetheless, we cannot award black lung 
benefits solely because of protracted administrative delay. 
Id. at 576. 
 
However, we can direct an award of benefits where the 
"result is foreordained." Caprini v. Director, OWCP, 824 F.2d 
283, 285 (3d Cir. 1987). Perhaps the clearest example of a 
foreordained result is Keating v. Director, OWCP , 71 F.3d 
1118, 1123-1125 (3d Cir. 1995), where we found that a 
remand for further proceedings would serve no useful 
purpose because the Director conceded the credibility of the 
claimant's witnesses and had no contrary evidence. Under 
those circumstances, we reviewed the evidence and found 
that the miner's widow was entitled to survivor's benefits. 
 
We have also declined to remand for further proceedings 
and have directed an award of benefits where the result 
was not as readily apparent as Keating. In Sulyma v. 
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Director, OWCP, 827 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1987), the Director 
conceded that the miner raised the interim presumption of 
disability under the applicable regulation. Id. at 923-924. 
However, the Director, although conceding that 
supplemental medical evidence would not be produced on 
remand, nonetheless requested a remand so that the ALJ 
could further interpret the evidence to determine if the 
Director's evidence was sufficient to rebut the interim 
presumption. Id. at 924. Because the Director had no 
further rebuttal evidence to produce on a remand, we 
reviewed the Director's medical evidence offered in rebuttal 
and concluded that it was insufficient to rebut the interim 
presumption. Id. at 924. Accordingly, "[i]n view of the 
absence of rebuttal evidence," we found that a remand for 
further proceedings was unwarranted, and, therefore, 
directed an award of benefits. Id. 
 
We followed the Sulyma rationale in Kowalchick, where 
the Director, although having no further rebuttal evidence 
to produce on a remand, nonetheless requested a remand 
for further proceedings. Once again, we reviewed the 
medical evidence the Director offered to rebut the interim 
presumption of disability and found it insufficient to rebut 
the presumption. Therefore, because we found the rebuttal 
evidence insufficient, we found remand unnecessary and 
instead directed an award of benefits. In Kowalchick we 
expanded upon our Caprini statement that we can direct an 
award of benefits where the result is foreordained. While 
acknowledging that a remand is necessary where the record 
supports conflicting inferences, we found that an award of 
benefits is appropriate where the record supports only one 
conclusion. Kowalchick v. Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d at 624. 
 
We believe that the record here supports only one 
conclusion, i.e., that Josephine Mancia met her burden of 
establishing that contributed to her husband's death. With 
the exception of Manganiello's April 11, 1991 note, 
Josephine Mancia's medical evidence clearly, consistently 
and unwaveringly demonstrated that the miner's death was 
caused by his lung disease. Manganiello's medical opinion 
as to the miner's cause of death was well-reasoned, 
supported by objective means and based on competent 
medical evidence. Moreover, even assuming that Mancia 
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died of a heart attack as stated in the April 11th note, the 
record is uncontradicted to that his lung disease would still 
have hastened his death. 
 
The Director's medical evidence was, contradictory and 
inconsistent with Mancia's medical history. We find that 
Josephone Mancia has demonstrated her entitlement to 
survivor's benefits as a matter of law. Thus, we will direct 
an award of survivor's benefits from the applicable date. 
 
Although this will not be appropriate in every case it is 
appropriate on this record. It is also consistent with the 
policy of the Department of Labor's Part 718 regulations, 
which recognizes that hardships can befall a miner's 
survivor when a black lung disability benefits are 
terminated because of the miner's death. The applicable 
regulation provides not only that a claim for survivor's 
benefits shall be adjudicated on an "expedited basis," but 
also that where the "initial medical evidence appears to 
establish that death was due to pneumoconiosis, the 
survivor will receive benefits unless the weight of the 
evidence as subsequently developed by the Director .. . 
establishes that the miner's death was not due to 
pneumoconiosis . . . ." 20 C.F.R. S 718.205(d). 
 
VI. 
 
Accordingly, we will grant the petition for review, reverse 
the decision of the Board and remand for the limited 
purpose of awarding survivor's benefits in accordance with 
20 C.F.R. S 725.503(c). Because Mrs. Mancia has been 
litigating this claim for seven years and because she is 78 
years old, we urge the BRB to expedite this award so that 
survivor's benefits will begin as soon as possible. 
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